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THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO SELL
"It is a part of a man's civil rights that he be at liberty to refuse
business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests
upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice. With
his reasons neither the public nor third persons have any legal concern!"'
"We have not yet reached the stage, where the selection of a
trader's customers is made for him by the government." This
is the cogent sentence which closes, and at the same time sum-
marizes, the opinion of Judge Lacombe, speaking for the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, of the Second Circuit, in the
recent decision in a case which has already become an epoch-
making one in the law of trade relations in this country.2 This
decision, and the decision of the U. S. District Court, of which
it is an affirmance, establish the right of a private trader to refuse
to sell, as a constitutional property right which cannot be taken
away by legislative interference, either state or national.
In that case, the defendant marketed under its own trade-
marked name and brand its own peculiar selection of a well-
known commodity which is constantly produced in the manufac-
ture of flour and in such quantities that the particular selection
in question consumed only an insignificant portion of the available
supply. By maintaining the dependability of its selection, as to
quality, and by establishing its reputation with the ultimate con-
sumer, it had made its brand of great celebrity and, therefore,
of great value. It delivered its goods to its customers at a uni-
form price throughout the country, absorbing freight charges and
diminished profits due to variations in the market price of the
commodity from which its selection was taken. It sold directly
to jobbers and the latter sold to retailers from whom the coh-
sumer purchased, and the prices to its direct vendees, and from
the latter to their vendees, were scheduled so as to allow a fair
profit to the retailer in his dealings with the ultimate consumer.
It did not attempt to control the resale price by any contract or
condition subsequent, applicable to any goods after they had
'Cooley on Torts, p. 278.
2 The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., deci-
sion by the U. S. C. C. of A., Second Circuit, filed Nov. 10, 1915, 227 Fed.
Rep. 46; affirming the decision in same case of U. S. Dist. Ct, Southern
Dist. of N. Y. (by Judge Hough), filed July 2o, 1915, 224 Fed. Rep. 566.
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passed out of its hands; but, by its system of distribution and
sale, expressly reserved the right to refuse to sell to any customer
who did not comply with its reasonable requests. In other
words, it impliedly announced its intention of refusing to sell, so
far only as further sales were concerned, to any customer who,
as to goods already sold, engaged in cut-price practices, to the
injury of its reputation and that of its brand, or to the injury of
those who were directly or indirectly its customers.
The plaintiff was a chain-store retailer whose business was so
large that defendant allowed it to buy in carload quantities and at
the carload price, and therefore it could, with a profit, sell at a
lower price than could the regular retailer who bought only in
smaller quantities and, therefore, at a higher cost. After a time,
the plaintiff began to use this advantage, not for its own profit,
but to establish a cut-price competition, to the injury of the
defendant's business and of that of the regular retailers upon
whose success depended that of defendant. Whereupon the
defendant refused to sell to plaintiff at any price; and the latter
brought suit for an injunction to compel defendant to sell plain-
tiff, and at the prices formerly maintained between the two. The
application was based upon the claim that the Anti-trust Acts,
and particularly the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, made the
refusal of defendant to sell plaintiff an attempt to restrain com-
petition by means of an indirect maintenance of prices and in
promotion of a monopoly in the branded goods in question.
The denial of the application for injunction by the District
Court and its affirmance by the Appellate Court were based on
the contention of the defendant, upon which it rested its defence,
that it was only exercising its constitutional right to refuse to
sell, and that under all the circumstances, and particularly in
view of the fact that its only monopoly was of its brand and
not of its merchandise, it could not be deprived of that right,
even though the Congress should attempt to do so.
A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Much misapprehension has been current as to the force and
effect of this decision, as well as to its consistency with other
federal decisions involving questions of price-maintenance. This
decision was the first under the so-called "Clayton Act," whereby
the provisions of the former Anti-trust Acts were amended and
extended. The tendency toward governmental interference in
matters of private contract and of interstate trade relations had
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been extending until the theory of federal legislation had emerged,
that, under the guise of regulating commerce between the states,
the Congress could lay its hand upon every private transaction
between individuals of different states. Just how far it was
intended to extend this theory by the Clayton Act, it is difficult
to determine from the confusion and manifest conflict of many
of its terms, and particularly those of Section 2 in which dis-
crimination as to prices and as to the selection of customers is
treated.3 So far, however, as concerns the right of a private
trader to refuse to sell, the rule is established by this case that,
if Doe refuses to bargain with Roe "for any reason or no reason,"
such conduct does not give Roe a cause of action; and that "if
the Congress has sought to give one, the gift is invalid, because
the statute takes from one person for the private use of another
the first person's private property."4  Or, as stated by Judge
Lacombe in that part of his decision which precedes the part
first above quoted:
"We had supposed that it was elementary law that a
trader could buy from whom he pleased and sell to whom
he pleased and that his selection of seller and buyer was
wholly his own concern. * *" * Before the Sherman
Act it was the law that a trader might reject the offer of
a proposing buyer, for any reason that appealed to him ;-
it might be because he did not like the other's business
methods, or because he had some personal difference with
him, political, racial or social. That was purely his own
affair, with which nobody else had any concern. Neither
the Sherman Act, nor any decision of the Supreme Court
construing the same, nor the Clayton Act has changed the
law in this particular."5
The "elementary law" referred to by Judge Lacombe is clearly
established by the decisions wherein has been involved the ques-
tion of the right of a private trader to accept or to refuse a
customer. The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
had held that, whatever might be the rights of a complainant to
an injunction against those conspiring to injure its business, an
injunction would not lie to compel a defendant against its will
a Clayton Act of October 15, 1914.
'The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224
Fed. Rep. 566.
'The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,
opinions by Judge Lacombe of U. S. C. C. of A., Second Circuit, filed
Nov. 10, 1915, 227 Fed. Rep. 46.
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to sell goods to the complainant.6 The U. S. Supreme Court
had held that "freedom to contract and abstain from contract-
ing and to exercise every reasonable right incident thereto
became the rule in the English law." 7  The federal court had
also said:
"All of the rights of contract which are necessary for
the carrying on of ordinary business affairs are protected
by the constitution, and are not capable of being restrained
by legislative action. Among these rights is that of
forming business relations between man and man. A man
may form business relations with whom he pleases, and
in the conduct of such business they may fix and limit the
character and amount of their business, the price they will
charge for the produce which they offer to the public, or
about which they contract. * * * A man has a con-
stitutional right to buy anything * * * or to refuse
to sell it at all.""
The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, decision
by Judge Lacombe, had also held:
"An individual manufacturer or trader may surely buy
from or sell to whom he pleases, and may equally refuse
to buy from or sell to anyone with whom he thinks it
will promote his business interests to refuse to trade.
That is entirely a matter of his private concern, with
which governmental paternalism has not as yet sought to
interfere."9
The same court, Eighth Circuit, decision by Judge Sanborn,
where a refusal to sell was complained of, held:
"There was no law which required the coal company
to sell its coal to Sharp on the terms which he prescribed,
or to sell it to him at all. It had the undoubted right
to refuse to sell its coal at any price. It had the right
to fix the prices and the terms on which it would sell it,
to select its customers, to sell to some and to refuse to
sell to others, to sell to some at one price and on one set
of terms, and to sell to others at another price and on a
different set of terms. There is nothing in the act of
July 2, 189 o , which deprived the coal company of any
'Greater New York Film Rental Co. v. Biograph Co., 203 Fed. Rep. -39.
'Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1, 56; and Adair v. U. S., 208
U. S. i6x, 172.
I In re Grice, 79 Fed. 627.
"Dueber Watch Case Co. v. Howard Watch Co., 66 Fed. 637, 645.
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of these common rights of owners and vendors of mer-
chandise, and, if it did not combine with some other per-
son or bersons so to do, its refusal to sell its coal to Sharp
unless he would withdraw his advertisement of a reduction
in his retail price of it, was not the violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act charged in the indictment." 10
PRICE-M INTENANCE NOT UNLAWFUL PER SE
The fallacy of those who deny the right to refuse to sell, or
who confine the exercise of such right within limits which do not
involve either a direct or indirect maintenance of resale prices,
arises from a misapprehension of the established fundamental
rule that a private person must be protected in his right to alienate
his private property. It is said that the property in a thing hav-
ing once passed from A to B, then B's right of alienation should
remain unrestricted, and that any attempt, by conditions sub-
sequent, either as to prices or otherwise, to restrain or restrict
such right of alienation, or in any wise to retain control of the
vendor of the thing sold, is a restraint of trade repugnant to the
common law as well as to statutory law.
It is further claimed that an attitude of mind on the part of
the vendor which is marked by his determination not to make
further sales, in case goods already sold are not handled by the
vendee according to. request, constitute such unlawful restriction
upon alienation. But such reasoning fails to recognize the very
right of alienation against which it is sought to avoid restriction.
The right to alienate cannot exist except that there goes with it
at the same time the right to refuse to alienate. Freedom of
alienation, which is the fundamental right, includes the right of
refusal to alienate just as much as it does the right to alienate.
Moreover, neither of these rights is dependent upon the motive
or the reasons which move the trader in his action with respect
to them. A private trader may sell to one man because he is
red headed, and may refuse to sell another man because he is
not red headed. The point is, that the reasons are immaterial.
Consequently, the right to refuse to alienate is not diminished by
the fact that it happens in any particular case that the real rea-
son for the refusal is the conduct of the proposed vendee with
respect to past transactions; and this is just as true whether the
conduct complained of is a failure to maintain resale prices as
any other action or failure of action.
' Union Pacific Coal Co. v. U. S., I73 Fed. Rep. 737.
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There is a distinction between the legal exercise of the right
of price-maintenance and the unlawful exercise of such right.
There is a vast difference, both in reason and in law, between an
attitude of mind on the part of the trader toward his customers
in respect of potential sales, and an attempt on the part of the
same trader to control by contract the resale prices of goods
already sold and to enforce such resale contracts by suits for
injunction or for damages. The fact is too much overlooked,
that the cases, in which resale prices have been attempted to be
maintained by a vendor and in which such attempts have been
held illegal and unenforcible, have been cases where the vendor
has attempted to enforce contracts, express or implied, between
himself and his vendee for the maintenance of such resale price.
Moreover, in such cases the particular merchandise in question
was of the kind which was not only susceptible of monopoly, but
was of a kind in which the vendor had an exclusive monopoly.
Such, for instance, was the so-called "Peruna" case ;"1 the patent
medicine case ;12 the copyrighted book cases ;'3 and the so-called
"Sanatogen" case? 4
All these cases involved a monopolized kind of merchandise
and the attempt on the part of the vendor to enforce a contract
as to resale prices. In none of them is involved the question of
the right to refuse to sell. Neither is the so-called "Toasted
Corn Flakes" case an authority for the restriction of the right
to refuse to sell, for that case involved a merchandise which was
confessedly prepared and cooked by a secret process and thereby
became a separate commodity actually monopolized by the ven-
dor; and by the decision in that case, the general right to refuse
to sell, applicable to unmonopolized articles, was expressly
recognized, for the court said:
"Nor do the facts present a case for the application of
the rule, that defendants are not required to sell anyone
they do not wish."1 5
It is also a mistake to view the consent decree entered in the
Kellogg case as an adjudication against the right to refuse to
"Park & Sons v. Hartntan, 153 Fed. 24.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373.
'Bobbs-Merrill v. Strauss, 2io U. S. 339; Strauss v. American Pub-
lishers Ass., 231 U. S. 222, 236.
"
4Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. i.
' U. S. v. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flakes Co., 222 Fed. 725-729.
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sell even as to the kind of merchandise there involved; for, by
the terms of the consent upon which such final decree was
entered, the right to refuse to sell was expressly reserved.
The statement, therefore, by Judge Lacombe, that, as applied
to branded goods as to which the monopoly consisted of the con-
trol of the brand rather than of the goods themselves, it was
"elementary law that a trader could sell to whom he pleased
and that his selection of seller and buyer was wholly his own
concern," is fully supported by all the precedents.
Indeed, further support of the right to refuse to sell in such
cases is shown by certain state decisions which, with their rea-
soning, are approved and followed by the federal courts in the
decisions of Judges Hough and Lacombe, here discussed. In
California, a marketer of a branded selection of olive oil was
held to have the right to make enforcible contracts for resale
prices,10 as was also the marketer of a selection of chocolate
which he sold under his special brand and name.1 7 In both those
cases the right was sustained, even as to the making of contracts
for resale prices, because the contract did not involve the whole
of any commodity, but only a selection therefrom, and because
the monopoly in question was only in the brand and name and
not in the commodity. The federal cases decided under the Anti-
trust Acts, already referred to, were clearly distinguished by the
California court. These cases and the decisions therein made
were afterwards followed by the Washington court in a case
where a manufacturer of a particular brand of flour was held to
have a monopoly, not of flour, but of his brand, and, there being
no monopoly of the commodity itself, therefore a contract for
a resale price was not unenforcible as being repugnant to the
prohibitions against restraint of trade, either under the common
law or under the statutes of the state or of the nation. s
PRICE-MAINTENAIqCE FOR BRANDED UNMONOPOLIZED GOODS
From the foregoing it is manifest that it has been too much
assumed by the proposers of certain federal legislation in amend-
ment of the present Anti-trust Acts, that the federal decisions
against price-maintenance prevent the marketer of a branded
selection out of an unmonopolized commodity, whose monopoly
"
6Grogan v. Chaffee, i56 Cal. 61x.
'Ghirardelli v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355.
' Fisher Flour Mills Co. v,. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649.
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consists alone of his trade-marked brand and name, from mak-
ing enforcible contracts as to resale prices which are reasonably
necessary to protect him in the business and good will built up
upon the strength of his own brand and name. It is now
clearly decided that, with respect to such selections of merchan-
dise, there is nothing in existing laws which prevents the trader
from refusing to sell; and, further, that any attempt to restrict
such right of refusal to sell, especially as applied to such mer-
chandise, would be invalid.
These decisions should be an authority and recommendation
to the Congress to pass the so-called "Stevens Bill," expressly
authorizing the maintenance by contract of resale prices, of goods
sold under trade-mark or special brand, provided the contracting
vendor has not a monopoly in the general class of merchandise
to which such goods belong and is not a party to a combination
with competitors to maintain such prices.
Whether the right of such price-maintenance shall depend
upon elementary principles of law, as held in these recent deci-
sions, or shall depend upon legislation, so far as such legislation
shall be necessary, the establishment of such right is absolutely
essential to the proper protection of the brand and name belong-
ing to any trader under the trade-mark laws. The establishment
of the right to refuse to sell, now clearly adjudicated to be beyond
the power of legislative interference, is a long step toward the
necessary protection of the owner of a trade-marked brand.
Without further legislation, such as is proposed by the Stevens
bill, the indulgence in unfair methods of competition through
price-cutting will result in the destruction of the good will and
business of the owners of brands and will injure public interests
by the stifling of competition.
THE STRANGLING OF COMPETITORS BY PRICE-CUTTING IS NOT
"COMPETITION"
A pric6 cutter is usually a financially strong trader, who makes
up his losses of profits on cut-price goods either by the number
of his sales or by extra profits on other articles sold to the con-
sumer under the decoy of the cut-price upon one or a few
articles. The regular retailer cannot meet such competition and
is driven out of business. That which is, properly speaking,
"competition" in trade, is thereby strangled and the only com-
petition which is promoted is that of the particular branded article
20]1
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against itself. As stated by Judge Hough in the decision above
cited:.
"the only trade restrained" [by price-maintenance of
branded selections of unmonopolized goods] "is the com-
mercial warfare of a large buyer against small ones, or
that of a merchant who for advertising purposes may sell
an article at a loss, in order to get customers at his shop,
and then persuade them to buy other things at a com-
pensating profit * * * Competition, as encouraged
by statutes and decisions, does not include such practices."
Indeed, as stated by Judge Hough, it is precisely such cut-price
methods of competition "whose hardships and injustice have
often been judicially commented upon."' 9 The Federal Supreme
Court, referring to such practices, has stated:
"In business or trade combinations they may even tem-
porarily, or perhaps permanently, reduce the price of the
article traded in or manufactured, by reducing the expense
inseparable from the running of many different companies
for the same purpose. Trade or commerce under those
circumstances may nevertheless be badly or unfortunately
restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and
worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, and who
might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered
surroundings."20
So, the New York Court of Appeals:
"An active competition and rivalry in business is,
undoubtedly, conducive to the public welfare, but we must
not shut our eyes to the fact that competition may be car-
ried to such an extent as to accomplish the financial ruin of
those engaged therein and thus result in a derangement of
the business, an inconvenience to the consumers, and in
public harm."21
In its most recent decision under the Anti-trust Acts the
Federal Supreme Court said:
"It is a mere truism to say that the fixing and main-
taining by a manufacturer of a fair price above cost is
not only a right but a commercial necessity; and any
"The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat C&.,
224 Fed. Rep. 566.
U. S. v. Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 321, 322-324.
'Park v. Natl Wholesale Druggists Assn., 175 N. Y. i.
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other course must end in his bankruptcy. When such fair
prices are departed from, and they are unreasonably raised
and exacted from the purchasing pftblic, the public is pre-judiced thereby. On the other hand, when that price is
so unreasonably lowered as to drive others out of the
business, with a view of stifling competition, not only is
that wronged competitor individually injured, but the
public is prejudiced by the stifling of competition. 22
THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO SELL MEANS GOVERN-
MENTAL PRICE FIXING
The denial of the right of a trader to refuse to sell, and that
independently of the reasons for his refusal, would mean a return
to the obsolete and the unworkable system of governmental price
fixing. To enjoin a trader from refusing to sell,-that is, to
impose by statute or by injunction a compulsion to sell,--neces-
sarily involves the fixing of the price at which he shall sell.
In the case before Judge Hough it was argued that, because
defendant could not enforce a price-fixing agreement, it could
not accomplish by any method, even indirectly or partially, any
fixing of prices. But this argument is answered by Judge Hough
by his statement that: "It is an amusing commentary on this
doctrine that the main object of this suit is to have this Court
compel delivery at $3.95 per case,-which is pro tanto price
fixing."2
3
A doctrine which viewed mere abstention from dealing as per
se price-fixing, and, therefore, as an abstention which gives the
right of injunction, would lead to a return to the meddling
paternalism of those ancient statutes which utterly disregarded
the fundamental right of liberty of contract and of property,-
statutes which were repugnant to the elementary private right
of alienation. Until comparatively recent times there have
remained upon the statute books of England certain ancient
statutes which have become obsolete, but which are the remnants
of the once interfering hand of the legislature in respect of pri-
vate contracts of sale. One of these is the statute fixing the
maximum price of labor and imposing upon all the legal obliga-
tion to work for anyone who demanded service.24 An English
"U. S. V. U. S. Steel Corporation, decided June 3rd, 1915, U. S. District
Court of New Jersey, opinion by Buffington, Judge, page 33.
"The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Ca.,
224 Fed. Rep. 566.
"The English Statute of Labours, of 1349.
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act of 1350 compelled laborers to stand for hire in open market
and to serve at not less than maximum prices, and also prohibited
departure from the country. In 1562 another statute required
all able-bodied persons between certain ages to work for anyone
demanding their services, and empowered justices-of-the-peace
and sheriffs in each county to fix and limit the wages to be paid;
and the same statute also fixed the minimum hours for labor.
In America the Continental Congress, on November 22, 1777,
in order to remedy the disadvantages of the depreciated currency,
passed a resolution providing for the appointment of commis-
sioners from the different states to regulate the price of labor,
manufactures and produce; and in 1778, the New York legis-
lature passed an act fixing the wages of labor and the prices of
many articles of merchandise and even the profits of traders and
vendors. In 1776-7, on the recommendation of a committee
representing the New England states, many of those states
adopted statutes fixing the maximum prices of labor and of
wheat, salt, sugar, molasses, shoes and of many other articles
of merchandise. All such statutes were found unenforcible as
a practical matter, although constitutional protection of the liberty
of contract and of the right of alienation of private property
was not then alone sufficiently preventive of the enforcement of
such legislation.
The assertion today of the right of governmental prohibition,
whether through the courts or through the legislature, of the right
of a private trader to refuse to sell his private property, would
be a return to the obsolete doctrines of those ancient statutes;
which are so contrary to the theory of our present constitutional
government, that they are now cited only as impossible absurd-
ities. They constitute instances, in the words of Judge Lacombe,
"where the selection of a trader's customers is made for him by
the government." They denote a policy of governmental med-
dling with private business transactions which has been altogether
too closely approached, but as yet not reached, in modern
American jurisprudence.
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